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The paper studies the relationship between social capital (SC) and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) by investigating the idea of a virtuous circle, between the level of 
SC and the implementation of CSR practices, that fosters socio-economic development 
by generating social inclusion and social networks based on trust and trustworthiness. 
Following  the  literature  on  SC  that  stresses  its  multidimensional  character,  both  a 
cognitive and a structural idea of SC are considered. The first one essentially refers to 
the dispositional characters of agents that affect their propensity to behave in different 
ways. The latter refers to social networks connecting agents. With regard to the concept 
of CSR, a contractarian approach is adopted and CSR is considered as an extended 
model of corporate governance, based on the fiduciary duties owed to all the firm’s 
stakeholders. Among stakeholders, a original distinction between “strong” and “weak” 
stakeholders is introduced. The key element that allows to distinguish between strong 
and weak stakeholders concerns the consequences that the break in the relationship with 
the firm produces both on the stakeholder and on the firm. Both these two categories 
have made specific investments in the firm. However, strong stakeholders are precious 
for the firm because they bring in strategic assets. On the contrary, weak stakeholders 
do not bring strategic assets into the firm and firms have material incentives at defecting 
in the relationship with them.  
Considering the notions of cognitive and structural SC, a contractarian approach to CSR 
and the distinction between weak and strong stakeholders, the paper shows that: a) the 
level of cognitive SC plays a key role in inducing the firm to adopt and observe CSR 
practices  that  respect  all  the  stakeholders;  b)  the  decision  of  adopting  formal 
instruments of CSR contributes to create cognitive SC that is endogenously determined 
in the model; c) the level of cognitive SC and the decision of adopting CSR practices 
creates structural SC in terms of a long term relationship between the firm and the weak 
and strong stakeholders. 
 
Keywords: Social capital, Corporate Social Responsibility, Social network, Ideal 
utility, Cooperation, Trust. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Trust, trustworthiness and ethical norms of reciprocity and cooperation have been 
receiving more and more attention in economic analysis. In particular, two concepts 
have been widely used in order to study the socio-economic effects of these factors: the 
concept  of  social  capital  (hereafter  also  SC)  and  of  corporate  social  responsibility 
(hereafter also CSR).  
After the seminal work by Putnam et al. (1993) that revealed the effect of SC on 
economic and government performance, many definitions of social capital have been 
introduced in the literature and have been considered in order to analyse the role of 
interpersonal relations in affecting economic activity by favouring cooperation
2.  
Different  approaches  characterize  also  the  notion  of  CSR.  If  we  look  at  the 
stakeholder  approach  (Freeman  1984,  2000,  Freeman  and  Evan  1990)  or  at  the 
contractarian approach to CSR (Sacconi 2004; 2006; 2007 a,b), relational aspects, in 
terms  of  trust,  trustworthiness  and  spirit  of  cooperation,  may  have  a  key  role  in 
promoting the coordination processes between firm and stakeholders that are essential 
in order to implement the CSR practices
3.  
Even though SC and CSR seem to be linked by many common elements related to 
the quality and quantity of social relations between agents, their relationship has not 
been deeply investigated yet. This paper is aimed at shedding light on some aspects of 
this relationship, in particular, by investigating the idea of a virtuous circle, between the 
level  of  SC  and  the  implementation  of  CSR  practices,  that  fosters  socio-economic 
development  by  generating  social  inclusion and  social  networks  based on  trust  and 
trustworthiness.  
Following  the  literature  on  SC  that  stresses  its  multidimensional  character  (e.g. 
Paldam 2000), we consider two dimensions of this notion. Starting from the distinction 
introduced by Uphoff (1999), we take into account a cognitive and a structural idea of 
SC. The first one essentially refers to the dispositional characters of agents that affect 
their  propensity  to  behave  in  different  ways.  The  latter  refers  to  social  networks 
connecting agents. 
With regard to the concept of CSR, we adopt a contractarian approach and consider 
CSR as an extended model of corporate governance, based on the fiduciary duties owed 
to  all  the  firm’s  stakeholders  (Sacconi  2006;  2007a).  Among  stakeholders,  we 
distinguish between “strong” and “weak” stakeholders. Both these two categories have 
made specific investments in the firm. However, strong stakeholders are precious for the 
firm because they bring in strategic assets. They are, for example, skilled workers or 
institutional investors. On the contrary, weak stakeholders do not bring strategic assets 
                                                
2 It is possible to identify two principal approaches to SC: social capital in terms of generalised trust or 
civic norms (e.g. Putnam et al. 1993 and Knack and Keefer 1997) and in terms of social networks (e.g. 
Coleman 1988; Lin 2001; Burt 2002). 
3 These relational elements related to the networks among firms and stakeholders are indubitably less 
important with regard to the implementation of CSR practices if one considers other approaches to CSR. 
This is the case, for example, of the approaches by Friedman (1977) and Jensen (2001). Both these 
authors do not give much room to the explicit consideration of the stakeholder’s interests by the owners 
of firms (see section 3).    3 
into the firm and firms have material incentives at defecting in the relationship with 
them. They are, for example, unskilled workers.  
Considering the notions of cognitive and structural SC and a contractarian approach 
to CSR, we show that:  
a)  the level of cognitive SC plays a key role in inducing the firm to adopt and 
observe CSR practices that respect all the stakeholders; 
b)  the  decision  of  adopting  formal  instruments  of  CSR  contributes  to  create 
cognitive SC that is endogenously determined in the model; 
c)  the level of cognitive SC and the decision of adopting CSR practices creates 
structural SC in terms of a long term relationship between the firm and the weak 
and strong stakeholders. 
This paper contributes to the literature on social capital, CSR and social networks in 
two ways. First we take seriously the problem of definition of social capital and analyse 
the theoretical relationship between two specific forms of SC. We distinguish between a 
cognitive and a structural dimension of SC and show under which condition cognitive 
SC can contribute to the creation of social networks.  
Second, the paper examines the complementariness between SC and CSR, showing 
that  they  generate  a  virtuous  circle  that  creates  favourable  conditions  for  socio-
economic development. We are not aware of previous studies on this specific topic. 
The paper is divided into five sections. In the second and third sections we define 
respectively  the  concept  of  SC  and  CSR  adopted  in  the  paper.  In  section  four  we 
extensively discuss the theoretical connections between the definitions of SC and of 
CSR. Concluding remarks follow. 
 
2.   A multidimensional approach to social capital  
 
Starting from the contributions by Coleman (1988, 1990) and Putnam et al. (1993), 
many definitions of SC have been proposed and an agreement on a commonly accepted 
definition has not been reached. Nevertheless, the multidimensional nature of SC seems 
to  be  commonly  recognized.  We  can  distinguish  at  least  between  two  main 
characterizations of this notion. On one hand, there are definitions that mostly look at 
the  networks  that  constitute  the  structure  of  relations  of  a  single  agent  or  of  a 
community as a whole (Coleman 1988, Lin 2001, Burt 1992, 2002). On the other hand, 
SC is defined by looking mostly at cultural and mental factors, such as attitude and 
norms (Putnam et al. 1993, Knack and Keefer 1997). Even though these two approaches 
are  linked,  there  are  few  analytical  studies  on  the  relationship  of  cause  and  effect 
between the definitions of SC in terms of social networks and of attitude and norms. In 
this perspective one of the attempts is by Uphoff (1999) who distinguishes and analyses 
the interrelations between two categories of social capital: structural SC and cognitive 
SC.  According  to  Uphoff’s  definition  “The  structural  category  is  associated  with 
various forms of social organization, particularly roles, rules, precedents and procedures 
as  well  as  a  variety  of  networks  that  contribute  to  cooperation,  and  specifically  to 
mutually  beneficial  collective  action  (MBCA),  which  is  the  stream  of  benefits  that   4 
results from social capital. The cognitive category derives from mental processes and 
resulting ideas, reinforced by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes, 
and beliefs that contribute cooperative behaviour and MBCA.” (Uphoff 1999, p. 218). 
In  particular, Uphoff stresses that  networks “are crucially  sustained  by expectations 
(that is, by norms) of reciprocity” and that this reveals the existence of an essential 
cognitive dimension of networks. Starting from the classification proposed by Uphoff, 
we  define  structural  SC  as  cooperative  network  between  agents,  and  focus  on  two 
specific elements of cognitive SC: beliefs and dispositions. Differently from norms and 
values, beliefs and dispositions have a micro dimension because are referred to single 
agents. Dispositions can be affected both by macro variables (norms and values shared 
by the community where agents live) and by micro elements (genetic and psychological 
factors).  Beliefs  depend  essentially  on  past  experience  and  on  mutual  agreement 
concerning the respect of specific commitments. 
Table  1  shows  the  main  features  of  the  two  categories  of  SC  according  to  our 
definition.  Beliefs  and  dispositions  are  the  constitutive  elements  of  our  notion  of 
cognitive SC. Beliefs in the behaviour of others depends on the behaviour they have 
already had in the past. Moreover, beliefs can be generated or reinforced by  ethical 
commitments  that  agents  take  (e.g.  subscribing  an  agreement  on  a  ideal  principle). 
Dispositions  principally  stem  from  the  norms  and  values  shared  in  the  community 
where the agents grow up, but they also depend on micro elements such as genetic and 
psychological factors. Both beliefs and dispositions can promote (or, obviously, reduce) 
trust and propensity to cooperate. 
 
Table 1 Categories of Social Capital 
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Structural social capital is constituted by cooperative linkages between agents. We 
consider essentially three factors that can promote the creation of cooperative relations: 
a) beliefs that others will be cooperative, b) disposition to cooperate and c) the existence 
of effective sanctions that punish the agents that do not cooperate.  
After having introduced in the next section the approach to CSR adopted in this 
paper, we will refer to the distinction between structural and cognitive SC in order to 
analyze the relationships between SC and CSR. In particular, our aim is to show how 
social capital and CSR interact generating a virtuous circle that increases the initial 
endowment of both these factors in a society. 
 
3.  The approaches to the concept of corporate social responsibility 
 
There are essentially three different ways to approach the concept of CSR. The first 
one is to deny or limit substantially the room for the social responsibility of firms. 
According to Friedman (1977), the only social responsibility of a firm is to make profits 
respecting the rules, that means without breaking the law. This idea is founded on two 
arguments. The first one concerns the principle of the maximization of the shareholder’s 
value. A manager must run a firm pursuing the interests of the group of people that he 
represents because they have given him the control of the firm. The second one comes 
from the firm belief that the maximization of the shareholder’s value implies an optimal 
use of resources and, consequently, the maximization of total wealth. Jensen (2001) 
supports the idea that a firm should firstly pursue the shareholder’s value maximization. 
This  author  stresses  that  the  substitution  of  this  aim  with  another  one  –  e.g.  the 
maximization of a function that explicitly includes the utility of all the stakeholders – 
could introduce the inability to provide a clear benchmark against which management 
strategies and company performances can be assessed, being this indeterminacy also the 
basis  for  the charge  of opening  the  route  to  opportunistic  behaviour  on  the  part of 
managers. Moreover, Jensen says that the maximization of shareholder’s value is able, 
in the long run, to solve problems and take into account also the interests of stakeholder 
that the stakeholder approach to CSR wants to satisfy. 
A second way to look at the CSR is to interpret the decision of adopting practices 
aimed  at  considering  interests  of  subjects  different  from  shareholders  as  a  kind  of 
philanthropy (Baron 2005).  
Finally, according to a more articulated approach to CSR, who runs a firm has to 
take into account the interests of all the stakeholders. Within this approach it is possible 
to distinguish between the stakeholder approach and the contractarian approach. The 
stakeholder  approach  was  introduced  by  Freeman  (1984)  who  stressed  the  idea  of 
ethical balance between the interests of the firm and stakeholders in a perspective of 
strategic management. The contractarian approach to CSR differs from the stakeholder 
approach principally because it aims at specifying, through a rational agreement (i.e. the 
social contract), a criterion for defining a balance of the firm’s stakeholders interests.  
In this paper we adopt the contractarian approach in order to study the relationship 
between SC and CSR for two main reasons. First, because the contractarian approach 
makes it possible to run a firm according to a multi-stakeholder approach by introducing 
a criterion for defining a balance among the firm’s stakeholders. Second, because the   6 
social contract underlies the relations between our notions of SC and CSR. In fact, as 
we will clarify in section 4, it is the social contract which allows:  
a)  to  activate  the  agent’s  beliefs  on  the  firm’s  behaviour  which  are  a  constitutive 
element of our notion of cognitive SC;  
b) the firm to develop a reputation and to induce its stakeholders to start cooperative and 
fiduciary relations which represent our concept of structural SC. 
 
3.1 The contractarian approach to CSR 
 
The contractarian approach to CSR stems from the idea that a firm is an institution 
that arises in order to solve the incompleteness of contracts and bounded rationality. In a 
context characterized by incompleteness of contracts and bounded rationality, economic 
institutions  allocate  through  property  rights  and  hierarchical  organizations  decision 
rights to certain parties in any sub-set of the economy. The need for general and abstract 
ethics principle rises from the risk this discretion may be abused.  
Within the theoretical framework of the contractarian approach, we define CSR as a 
“model  of  extended  corporate  governance  whereby  who  runs  a  firm  (entrepreneurs, 
directors  and  managers)  have  responsibilities  that  range  from  fulfilment  of  their 
fiduciary duties towards the owners to fulfilment of analogous fiduciary duties towards 
all the firm’s stakeholders” (Sacconi 2006). 
In  order  to  clarify  the  introduced  definition  of  CSR  two  notions  require  to  be 
expanded: the concept of fiduciary duty and of stakeholders.  
The notion of fiduciary duties, refers to situation where a subject has a legitimate 
interest but is unable to make the relevant decisions in the sense that s/he does not know 
what aims to pursue, what alternative to choose, or how to deploy his/her resources in 
order to satisfy his/her interest. This subject, the trustor, can delegate decisions to a 
trustee giving him the power to choose actions and goals. The trustee may thus count on 
the  resources  of trustor  and  select the  appropriate course  of  action.  For  a  fiduciary 
relationship to arise, the trustor must have a claim (right) towards the trustee. In other 
words, the trustee acts and uses the resources made over to him/her in order to achieve 
results that satisfy (to the best extent possible) the trustor’ s interests. These claims (i.e. 
the trustor’ s rights) impose fiduciary duties on the agent who is entitled with authority 
(the trustee), which s/he is obliged to fulfil
4.  
By  the  term  ‘fiduciary  duty’,  therefore,  we  mean  the  duty  (or  responsibility)  to 
exercise  authority  for  the  good  of  those  who  have  granted  that  authority  and  are 
therefore subject to it.  
The  term  stakeholders  denotes  individuals  or  groups  with  a  major  stake  in  the 
running of the firm and who are able to influence it significantly (Freeman and McVea 
2002). Different categories of stakeholders can be specified. We introduce a original 
distinction between strong and weak stakeholders. Both these categories make specific 
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investments in the firm
5. The key element that allows to distinguish between strong and 
weak stakeholders concerns the consequences that the break in the relationship with the 
firm produces both on the stakeholder and on the firm.  
a) Strong stakeholder. The difference between  the  discounted payoff  that strong 
stakeholders and firms get cooperating forever and defecting at the first stage (and not 
cooperating ever again) is positive. Strong stakeholders bring strategic assets into the 
firm. They are for example institutional investors or highly skilled workers.  
b) Weak stakeholder. Weak stakeholders would like to cooperate forever with the 
firm, but the discounted payoff that the firm gets cooperating forever with them is lower 
than the payoff it obtains defecting at the first stage and not cooperating ever again. 
Weak stakeholders do not bring strategic assets into the firm. They are for example 
ordinary investors, unskilled workers or unskilled contractors. 
The  definition  of  CSR  as  an  extended  responsibility  towards  its  stakeholders  is 
rooted in neo-institutional theory (Williamson 1975, 1986; Grossman and Hart 1986; 
Hart  and  Moore  1990;  Hart  1995;  Hansmann  1996).  According  to  this  theoretical 
approach, the firm emerges as an institutional form of ‘unified transactions governance’ 
aimed  at  remedying  imperfections  in  the  contracts  that  regulate  exchange  relations 
among subjects endowed with diverse assets. The joint use of these assets generates a 
surplus. Agents must find an agreement on the conditions characterizing their exchange 
relations. The agreements essentially concern: the reciprocal investment that must be 
realized to generate the surplus and the way of dividing the surplus. The contracts that 
have to regulate these agreements can not be complete. They do not include provisos 
referred to unforeseen events, either because of the costs of drafting them, or because 
the cognitive limits of the human mind that make it impossible to predict all possible 
states  of  the  world.  It generates  the  risk  of  opportunistic  behaviour  in  the case  the 
unforeseen events happen and the renegotiation of the contracts’ conditions becomes a 
necessity.  For  fear  of  opportunistic  behaviour  that  the  party  in  a  stronger  ex  post 
position  can  have  appropriating  the  entire  surplus,  thereby  expropriating  the  other 
stakeholders, agents, that expect to be expropriated, will have no incentive to undertake 
their investments at the optimal level. This expectation of unfair treatment can generate 
a loss of efficiency at the social level.  
The firm responds to this problem by bringing the various transactions under the 
control of a hierarchical authority - the authority, that is, of the party which owns the 
firm and through ownership is entitled to make decisions over the contingencies that 
were not ex ante contractible
6. This party is thus safeguarded against opportunism by 
the other stakeholders and will realize the optimal level of investment. Nevertheless, 
there is a risk of abuse of authority against the other parties (Sacconi 1999, 2000, 2006). 
Those wielding authority, in fact, are able to threaten the other stakeholders. The former 
can exclude the latter from access to physical assets of the firm, or from the benefits of 
the contract, to the point that those other stakeholders become indifferent between the 
decision  to  accept  the  expropriation  and  the  decision  to  forego  the  value  of  their 
                                                
5 Specific investments may significantly increase the total value generated by the firm (net of the costs 
sustained for that purpose) and are made in relation to a specific firm (and not in any other). 
6 The decision about the party that must have the residual right of control may depend on various factors - 
e.g. a comparative analysis of control’s costs of the different stakeholders- see Sacconi 2006 for a deeper 
explanation.   8 
investments by withdrawing from the relation. Thus the entire surplus, included that 
part produced by the efforts and investments made by the non controlling stakeholders, 
will be appropriated by those in a position of authority. Again forward-looking non 
controlling stakeholders will be deterred to enter in relation with the controlling party.  
Many stakeholders among the non controlling ones, will ex ante be discouraged 
from investing (if they foresee the risk of  abuse),  while  ex  post  they will resort to 
conflicting or disloyal behaviour (typically possible when asymmetry of information is 
inherent in the execution of some subordinate activity) in the belief that they are being 
subjected to abuse of authority. Therefore, the optimal level of investment could not be 
achieved  and  a  second  best  solution  arises.  All  governance  solutions  based  on  the 
allocation of property rights to a single party may approximate social efficiency, but 
they can never fully achieve it.  
The relative (in)efficiency is due to manifest or simply expected unfairness. This is 
the  reason  why  non  optimal  level  of  investment  are  realized  by  non  controlling 
stakeholders and it underlines the role that fairness plays in affecting efficiency, at least 
with  regard  to  the  real-life  problem  of  working  out  an  acceptable  solution  for  the 
governance of transactions.  
According to the contractarian approach adopted in this paper, when CSR is viewed 
as  ‘extended  governance’,  it  can complete  the  firm as  an institution  of  transactions 
governance  (Sacconi  2000;  2006).  The  firm’s  legitimacy  deficit  is  remedied  if  the 
residual control right is associated with further fiduciary duties towards the subjects that 
face the risk of abuse of authority and are deprived of the residual control right. At the 
same  time,  this  generates  an  increase  in  social  efficiency  because  it  reduces  the 
disincentives and social costs generated by the abuse of authority. In order to avoid the 
second best solution due to the risk of abuse of authority, the firm must be ground on a 
rational agreement (the constitutional contract of the firm) between who runs the firm 
and the non controlling stakeholders (see Sacconi 2006). The constitutional contract of 
the firm is the basis not only for the allocation of control over the firm but also to 
include in this structure other rights – essentially responsibility claims in defence of 
stakeholders  other  those  protected  by  the  property  right.  The  resulting  institutional 
structure defines the principles of the firm’s governance structure consistently with the 
notion of CSR as a governance model with multiple fiduciary duties.  
From this perspective, ‘extended governance’ should comprise: 
•  the  residual  control  rights  (ownership)  allocated  to  the  stakeholder  with  the 
largest investments at risk and with relatively low governance costs (as well as 
the right to delegate authority to professional directors and management); 
•  the fiduciary duties of those who effectively run the firm  (administrators and 
managers) towards the owners, given that these have delegated control to them; 
•  the  fiduciary  duties  of  those  in  a  position  of  authority  (the  owner  or  the 
managers) towards the non-controlling stakeholder. In particular considering the 
obligation  to  run  the  firm  so  that  the  non-controlling  stakeholders  are  not 
deprived  of  their  fair  shares  of  the  surplus  produced  from  their  specific 
investments, and that they are not subject to negative externalities. 
The constitutional contract of the firm provides that authority should be delegated to 
the  stakeholder  most  efficient  in  performing  governance  functions  and  defines  the   9 
fiduciary  duties  of  this  part  towards  the  non-controlling  stakeholders
7.  In  fact,  the 
stakeholders agree to  submit  to authority, thereby rendering it effective, only  if the 
contract contains the proviso that stipulates that the firm’s new governance structure 
must  comply  with  fiduciary  duties  towards  all  the  stakeholders  (owners  and  non-
owners). Otherwise, the risk of abuse of authority can not be overcome.
   
The definition of social contract and constitution of the firm stems from the solution 
of a bargaining cooperative game in which stakeholders must agree on a shared action 
plan (a joint strategy) which allocates tasks among the members of the team so that the 
contribution of each of them is efficient (because it produces the maximum surplus net 
of each stakeholder’ s costs) and defines the sharing of the surplus that is generated by 
the cooperation
8.  
After having specified the contractarian approach to the CSR that we adopt in this 
paper,  after  having  argued  its  theoretical  foundation  in  the  framework  of  the  neo-
institutional theory, and after having introduced the role of the social contract in facing 
the risk of abuse of authority, we have to analyze the implementation aspects of this 
notion of CSR. In particular, we are going to investigate if the social contract is also 
able  to  induce  endogenous  incentives  and  motivations  for  the  firm  to  adopt  the 
normative model of extended fiduciary duties. Moreover, we will show how this model 
can be implemented by the firm.  
The idea is that the incentives related to the formation of reputation can play a key 
role in the firm’s decision to endorse and respect extended fiduciary duties towards all 
the stakeholders.. The stakeholders will decide to cooperate with the firm if they trust 
that it will not abuse of them If stakeholders observe that the firm always respects the 
social contract, it will increase its reputation and stakeholders will decide to invest at an 
optimal level into the firm. If they observe an opportunistic behaviour by the firm, its 
reputation will dramatically diminish.  
The problem with regard to the creation of reputation arises because the relations 
between the firm and its stakeholders are characterized by settings in which information 
or knowledge about the action of the firm is incomplete or highly asymmetric. Because 
of  incomplete  information,  the  stakeholders  can  not  verify  if  the  firm  has  actually 
behaved as a honest cooperative agent by trying to avoid any opportunistic behaviour. 
Incomplete information essentially eliminates the possibility for the firm to develop a 
reputation. 
In  order  to  avoid  the  consequences  caused  by  incomplete  information  on  the 
formation of reputation, the firm must subscribe an explicitly announced standard that 
sets out general principles, whose contents are such to elicit stakeholder consensus, as 
well as explicit commitments to compliance with principles and rules which are to be 
known  ex  ante  by  stakeholders.  The  standard  must  contain  explicit  norms  with  an 
                                                
7 Two are the main fiduciary duties towards the non-owners that should be defined in the social contract: 
1.  to avoid the production of negative external effects on stakeholders not party to transactions, or 
compensate them so that they remain neutral; 
2.  to remunerate the stakeholders participating in the firm’  s transactions with pay-offs which, 
taken for granted a fair status quo, must contain a part tied to the firm’s economic performance 
such  to  approximate  fair/efficient  shares  of  the  surplus  (assuming  that  this  is  positive)  as 
envisaged by the first social contract. 
8 With regards to the rational bargaining over the firm constitutions and the related Nash bargaining 
solution (Nash 1950; Harsanyi 1977) see Sacconi 2006.   10 
appropriate structure that must be endorsed by the firm and established in the light of a 
multi-stakeholder social dialogue, such to induce impartial acceptability.  
It  is  the  standard  that  enables  the  social  mechanism  of  reputation  to  function 
properly  by  allowing  stakeholders  to  increase  their  trust  in  the  firm  and  in  its 
compliance with CSR principles. The standard and the procedures ensuring compliance 
with  it,  are  announced  ex  ante;  and  it  is  on  these  –  not  in  relation  to  particular 
(unforeseen) events or to particular (unobservable) actions or outcomes – that the firm 
and stakeholders pass homogeneous judgement on ex post compliance with them. The 
reputation is created if the behaviour of the firm is coherent with the principles declared 
in the standard
9. Compliance with CSR voluntary but explicit norms (codes of ethics, 
management system standards etc.) can solve the incomplete information problem and 
can  allow  the  firm  to  develop  its  reputation  and  get  its  share  of  surplus  produced 
through the cooperation with the stakeholders.  
 
4.   Social capital and corporate social responsibility: a theoretical analysis 
 
In this section we analyze the relationships between SC and CSR. Our principal aim 
is to show how SC and CSR interact generating a virtuous circle that increases the 
initial endowment of both these factors in a society. We identify three main levels of 
interaction between social capital and CSR.  
1.  In the first, cognitive SC, understood as dispositions, is an input of CSR. The 
more individuals who are in contact with firms have disposition to cooperate 
with  agents  who  respect  principles  of  cooperation,  the  more  firms  have 
incentives to develop a reputation by adopting a CSR standard that declares their 
compliance with the principles.  
2.  In the second, the adoption of an explicit CSR standard generates cognitive SC, 
in terms of beliefs. The commitments to compliance with CSR principles, in 
terms of fulfilment of fiduciary duties towards all the stakeholders, contributes 
to determine the beliefs of stakeholders on the cooperative behaviour of firms.  
3.  Finally,  cognitive  SC,  both  dispositions  and  beliefs,  and  CSR  create  the 
economic incentives that induce the firm to completely fulfil its commitments 
towards all its stakeholders. It means that firms will decide to cooperate with all 
its stakeholders creating a cooperative network that would not be created in the 






                                                
9  This theory  of  reputation under  unforeseen contingencies  is  fully  developed in Sacconi  (2000  and 
2004d). For a design of a CSR management standard that corresponds to the characters now defined see 
for example Sacconi DeColle Baldin (2003) and Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics (2002).   11 
4.1 Conformist preferences and cognitive social capital 
 
In order to attain this aim, first we have to specify better the concept of cognitive 
social  capital in  terms  of belief and disposition. We start from the assumption that 
agents  have  motives  to  act  that  are  not  purely  geared  to  material  advantages 
(consequences of actions), but which extend beyond the mere material advantage. In 
particular, we assume that agents have conformist preferences (Grimalda and Sacconi 
2002, 2005; Sacconi 2007a) that are defined over states of affairs that are described as 
sets of interdependent actions characterized in terms of their degree of conformity to a 
given abstract principle or ideal.  
The  utility  function  of  agents  that  have  motives  to  act  that  depend  also  on 
conformist preferences is: 
 
Vi = U i (σ) + λ i F [T(σ)].  
 
The first term U i (σ) is the material utility got by agent i in state σ. The second term 
is the ideal utility and reflects the agent’s concern with other types of reasons to action, 
meant in general as the degree of conformity of the social state of affairs (σ) - the 
agent’s and the others participants’ behaviours - to the normative principle of welfare 
distribution T.  
λi is an exogenous parameter that represents the disposition to conform to the ideal 
principle T given the beliefs in the others’ behaviour. The motivation to conform to the 
principle T for agent i depends on the value of λ i. The higher λ i is, the more the agent i 
will be disposed to conform to the principle T if he believes that the others will conform 
to the principle. λ  i represents the endowment of cognitive social capital (in terms of 
disposition) of agent i.  
The effects on ideal utility of beliefs (in the degree of conformity to the ideal of 
other agents) is captured by the function F. Following Grimalda and Sacconi (2002), we 
adopt  a  particular  specification  for  F  based  on  an  idea  of  expected  mutuality  in 
conforming to the normative prescriptions. If we consider a two-person game, F can 
specified by considering two elements
10: 
1.  fi:  the  index  of  conditional  conformity  of  player  i.  The  value  of  this  index 
depends on how much the player i contributes to carry out the ideal T with his 
behaviour  (i.e  by  conforming  or  deviating  from  the ideal  T),  given  what  he 
believes about the other player’s choice.   
2.  j f
~
: the esteem that player i forms about j’s compliance with the ideology. The 
value of this index depends on how much the other player contributes to carry 
out the ideal T with his behaviour (i.e by conforming or deviating from the ideal 
T),  given  what  second  player  believes  (and  first  player  believes  that  second 
player believes) that first player will do. 
These two indices contribute to determine F and the utility function becomes: 
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i b  is the first order belief that player 1 has in the action of player j. 
2
i b  is the 
second order belief about player j’s belief in the action adopted by player i. 
Both beliefs and dispositions play a key role in determining the (ideal) utility of the 
stakeholder i: 
a)  If i conforms totally to the ideal principle T and believes that j will conform 
totally to the ideal, then the ideal utility of i will assume the maximum value: 
 
i i λ λ = × × 1 1  
 
b)  If  i  does  not  conform  completely  and  believe  that  also  j  will  not  conform 
completely, the value of ideal utility will be lower than λi: 
 
i i y x λ λ < − − ) 1 )( 1 (  
 
c)  Finally, if the conformity of one of the two agents is zero, the ideal utility got by 
agent i goes to zero: 
 
0 ) 1 )( 1 1 ( = − − i y λ  
 
The belief, in the behaviour of others with regard to their conformity with the ideal 
principle T, and the disposition, to conform to T given the belief, determine the value of 
the ideal utility got by agents that have conformist preferences and are the two elements 
that constitute our notion of cognitive social capital. The disposition λ is generated both 
by micro and macro factors. First it is related to psychological and genetic factors that 
affect the disposition of each individual. Second, it is affected by the culture and social 
norms that characterize the community where the agents live. Belief of agents in the 
degree  of  conformity  to  the  principle  of  others  depends  on  two  factors  strictly 
interrelated.  First,  beliefs  can  arise  in  relation  to  a  rational  agreement  that  agents 
subscribe where they declare the decision to respect and conform to the principle T. 
Second, they depend on the past behaviour of others (that can confirm or not their actual 
willingness to conform).  
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4.2  The  CSR  principle  and  the  relationship  between  CSR  and  cognitive  social 
capital 
 
After having clarified the definition of cognitive SC in terms of dispositions and 
beliefs, we introduce the notion of CSR and investigate the connection between CSR 
and  cognitive  SC  with  regard  to  two  specific  classes  of  agents:  the  firm  and  its 
stakeholders. The definition of CSR as an extended model of corporate governance, 
based on the fiduciary duties owed to all the firm’s stakeholders enters in this analysis 
essentially in relation to the principle T. In our analysis T is the abstract and general 
principle that the firm must explicitly endorse if it wants to develop a reputation that can 
induce stakeholders to enter in cooperative relations with it. As we showed in section 
3.1,  if the firm wants  to be  trusted  by stakeholders,  it  must subscribe an  explicitly 
announced standard that sets out general principles. This standard allows stakeholders 
to increase their trust in the firm and in its compliance with the (CSR) principles. A 
characterisation in contractarian terms of the ideal principle T is given by the Nash 
bargaining solution, called also Nash social welfare function N: 





where di stands for the reservation utility that agent i can obtain when the bargaining 
process collapses. 
The adoption of the CSR principle by the firm is also interconnected with both the 
beliefs and the dispositions of the stakeholders who have to decide whether to enter into 
a cooperative relation with the firm or not.  
First, the disposition λ of stakeholders may incentive the firm in adopting the CSR 
standard.  In  fact,  according  to  our  definition  of  conformist  preferences,  when  λi 
increases, it increases also the utility of the stakeholder i in cooperating with a firm that 
conforms to the principle T. Because of that, stakeholders characterized by high levels 
of λ will decide to trust a firm that declares and respects CSR principles sooner than 
stakeholders with low levels of λ. It means that a firm, which acts in a context where the 
stakeholders are endowed by high cognitive SC, will be able to develop a reputation 
faster and have lower costs than a firm which is related to stakeholders who do not have 
high endowment of cognitive SC (in terms of λ). Obviously the firm is interested in 
developing a reputation because it induces stakeholders to invest their resources in the 
firm at an optimal level with positive effects on the firm’s activity. 
Second, the adoption of a CSR standard affects the beliefs of the stakeholders. It is 
only through the explicit declaration of the principle T that stakeholders can form their 
beliefs  on the type of the firm they are related to. Without the adoption of a CSR 
standard, because of the incomplete information that characterizes the relations between 
the firm and its stakeholders (section 3.1), the stakeholders can not form their belief in 
the conformity of the firm to the principle and, consequently, can not obtain the ideal 
utility which strictly depends on beliefs. 
Dispositions, beliefs and the adoption of a CSR standard can induce stakeholders to 
cooperate with the firm and to undertake their investments at the optimal level. The 
stakeholders get a positive material utility in cooperating with the firm until the firm   14 
does not abuse them. Moreover, the stakeholders get ideal utility until they observe that 
the firm conforms to the CSR principle, that is it fulfils its fiduciary duties towards all 
the stakeholders. If a stakeholder observes an opportunistic behaviour by the firm, its 
reputation  will  dramatically  diminish.  A  stakeholder  loses  his  ideal  utility  in 
cooperating with the firm both if the firm abuses him and if the firm abuses another 
stakeholder and the loss of the ideal utility depends on the value of λ.  
 
4.3 The relationship between CSR, cognitive social capital and structural social 
capital 
 
After having discussed the relationship between CSR and cognitive SC, we analyze 
the role that these two elements have in promoting the creation of structural SC in terms 
of  cooperative  relations  between  the  firm  and  its  stakeholders.  According  to  the 
definitions we introduced in section 3.1, the stakeholders of a firm can be divided into 
two classes. Strong and weak stakeholders. Looking only at their monetary payoffs, 
both strong stakeholders and the firm are reciprocally interested in cooperating. On the 
contrary, the cooperative relation between weak stakeholders and the firm is asymmetric 
and not sustainable in the long term. The firm has economic incentives in defecting in 
the relation with weak stakeholders who do not bring strategic assets into the firm.  
Obviously,  both  strong  and  weak  stakeholders  are  under  the  risk  of  abuse  of 
authority. Nonetheless, the strong stakeholders have the possibility to punish the firm 
which  abuses  by  stopping  to  cooperate  with  it
11.  The  gain  that  the  firm  gets  by 
cooperating  with  the  strong  stakeholders  reduces  the  risk  of  abuse  for  the  latter. 
Conversely,  the  weak  stakeholders  do  not  have  any  possibility  to  avoid  the  abuse, 
because  the  firm  is  not  interested  in  starting  a  cooperation  process  with  them  and, 
consequently has no fear of a sanction by the weak stakeholders.  
According to our idea, if (strong) stakeholders are endowed by high cognitive SC in 
terms of dispositions to cooperate with agents who conform to principles of cooperation 
and they believe that the firm will be cooperative with all the stakeholders, then the firm 
who  contradicts  these  beliefs  by  behaving  opportunistically  with  weak  stakeholders 
faces the sanction of the strong ones who may decide to stop cooperating with it. For 
this  reason,  in  presence  of  an  appropriate  structure  of  dispositions  and  beliefs,  the 
punishment of strong stakeholders, that consists in stopping their cooperation with the 
firm, may be a protection against opportunistic behaviour of the firm also for the weak 
stakeholders. 
Let  us  start  from  a  situation  in  which  the  stakeholders  of  the  firm  (consumers, 
suppliers  etc.)  are  characterized  by  high  level  of  λ.  According  to  the  argument 
developed  in  the  previous  section,  this  firm  will  have  incentives  to  adopt  the  CSR 
standard.  In  fact,  stakeholders  with  high  level  of  λ  will  decide  to  trust  a  firm  that 
declares and respects CSR principles sooner than stakeholders with low levels of λ. For 
this reason, a firm, who acts in a context where stakeholders are endowed by high 
                                                
11  Moreover,  in  a  previous  work,  Sacconi  (2006)  has  shown  that  if  stakeholders  have  conformist 
preferences, the firm can not apply a mixed strategy or a “refined abuse strategy” (i.e. a strategy which 
induces an equilibrium in which the firm abuses with the maximum possible probability compatible with 
maintaining stakeholder indifference between entry and non-entry).    15 
cognitive SC, will be able to develop a reputation faster and suffer lower costs than a 
firm which is related to stakeholders who do not have high endowment of cognitive SC 
(in terms of λ). It is the adoption of the CSR standard which allows the stakeholders to 
form  their  beliefs  in  the  respect  of  cooperative  principles  by  comparing  the  firm’s 
behaviour with its CSR declaration. The CSR standard, beliefs and dispositions generate 
a  positive  ideal  utility  that  the  stakeholders  get  by  cooperating  with  the  firm  who 
conforms to the CSR principle.  
If the firm decides to stop cooperating with weak stakeholders, because its material 
payoffs are higher if it defects than if it cooperates with them, then it stops conforming 
with the ideal CSR principle. If the strong stakeholders of the firm have conformist 
preferences and they conform to the CSR principle that concerns the fulfilment of the 
duties towards all the stakeholders, when the firm behaves opportunistically with the 
weak stakeholders, they lose their ideal utility. If λ, that is the weight of the ideal utility 
in the agents’ utility function, is high enough, the strong stakeholders may decide to 
punish the firm which abuses the weak stakeholders. In particular, they may be ready to 
lose the investment they have made in the firm, i.e. the material utility that they get by 
cooperating  with  it,  in  order  to  start  a  new  cooperative  relation  with  a  firm  who 
conforms to the principle of cooperation. This represents a sanction for the firm that 
loses the gain that it gets by cooperating with strong stakeholders 
The possibility that the strong stakeholders stop their cooperation is a credible threat 
for the firm because it is connected with endogenous incentives that are determined by 
the role of cognitive SC on stakeholders’ ideal utility. The fear of being punished by the 
strong stakeholders can induce the firm not to abuse the weak stakeholders, thus making 
cooperative relations sustainable also between the firm and its weak stakeholders.  
Starting from a precise definition of cognitive SC, from a contractarian approach to 
CSR and from the assumption that agents have motives to act that are not purely geared 
to  material  advantages  (conformist  preferences)  our  theoretical  argument  leads  to  a 
positive relation between cognitive social capital, CSR practices and structural social 
capital.  Cognitive  SC  and  CSR,  by  reciprocally  interacting,  generate  endogenous 
incentives  for  the  firm  to  behave  cooperatively  with  weak  stakeholders.  In  this 
perspective, they generate the condition for the creation of structural social capital that 
would not be created otherwise. 
Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical relations between cognitive SC, adoption of the 
CSR standard, creation of reputation and creation of cooperative relations between the 








































1  The  rational  agreement  between  who  runs  the  firm  and  the  non  controlling 
stakeholders  which  defines  the  abstract  and  general  principle  T  and  the  related 
standard of CSR:  
•  allow the firm to develop a reputation that can induce stakeholders to enter 
in cooperative relations with it; 
•  make possible the creation of the ideal utility (the principle T has a key role 
in the utility function of agents with conformist preferences); 
•  allow the formation of stakeholders’ belief in the conformity of the firm to 
the principle T. 
2  Beliefs and dispositions to conform to the CSR ideal principle T affect the ideal 
utility which depend on λ (when λi increases, it increases also the utility of the 
stakeholder i in cooperating with a firm that conforms to the principle T) and on the 
belief on the others’ behaviour with respect to the conformity with the principle T.  







Cooperation between the firm and its 
stakeholders 
Reputation 
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3  The  ideal  utility  reduces  the  cost  of  developing  a  reputation.  Stakeholders  who 
obtain ideal utility by cooperating with a firm which respects the CSR principle T 
will trust the firm sooner than stakeholders who do not obtain ideal utility. 
4  A good reputation contributes to increase belief that the firm will respect the CSR 
principle. Stakeholders with conformist preferences who notice that the firm has a 
good reputation (because it respects its commitments) will reinforce their belief in 
the cooperative character of the firm. 
5  Ideal utility and reputation induce stakeholders to enter into a cooperative relation 
with  the  firm.  In  particular,  the  ideal  utility  obtained  by  strong  stakeholders  in 
cooperating with a firm which confirms to the principle T could induce the firm to 
respect  all  the  stakeholders.  In  fact,  if  the  firm  stops  to  cooperate  with  weak 
stakeholders, the strong stakeholders lose their ideal utility in cooperating with it If 
λ is  high enough,  the strong stakeholders may decide  to punish  the firm  which 
abuses the weak stakeholders by stopping their cooperation with it. This possibility 
is a credible threat for the firm because it is connected with endogenous incentives 
related to the effect of cognitive SC on stakeholders’ ideal utility. The fear of being 
punished  by  the  strong  stakeholders  can  induce  the firm  not  to  abuse  the  weak 
stakeholders, thus making cooperative relations sustainable also between the firm 




The aim of this paper was to investigate the relationship between social capital and 
CSR.  Our  principal  point  has  been  to  highlight  the  importance  of  cognitive  SC, 
understood as dispositions and beliefs, and CSR principles in generating networks of 
cooperative relations between the firm and its stakeholders. In order to obtain this goal, 
we have introduced a definition of CSR coherent with a contractarian approach and two 
different notions of SC, the cognitive and the structural social capital. Cognitive SC has 
been defined as dispositions to conform with ethical principles of cooperation and as 
beliefs in other conformity to the same principles. With regard to the CSR notion, it has 
been defined as a model of extended corporate governance whereby who runs a firm 
have responsibilities that range from fulfilment of their fiduciary duties towards the 
owners to fulfilment of analogous fiduciary duties towards all the firm’s stakeholders. 
We  have  also  introduced  a  distinction  between  strong  and  weak  stakeholders.  The 
former bring in the firm strategic assets, the latter invest in the firm but without bringing 
in strategic assets. The firm is interested in cooperating in the long term with strong 
stakeholders and it is not interested in doing the same with weak stakeholders.  
According to our theoretical argument, the disposition of stakeholders to conform 
with agents who share ethical principles of cooperation represents a incentive for the 
firms  to  adopt  CSR  standards.  Stakeholders  who  are  characterized  by  this  kind  of 
disposition will trust a firm who respects ethical principles of cooperation sooner than 
stakeholders who are not. For this reason, to declare (and to observe) CSR principles is 
more  convenient  for  a  firm  who  acts  in  a  context  characterized  by  high  level  of 
cognitive social capital (in terms of dispositions) than for a firm who is connected with 
stakeholders who are not endowed by cognitive social capital.   18 
In order to arise trust in stakeholders, because of the incompleteness of contracts and 
bounded  rationality,  the  firm  has  to  explicitly  declare  the  principles  (in  terms  of 
fulfilling of the fiduciary duties towards all the stakeholders) that will characterize its 
behaviour.  By  comparing  the  statements,  formulated  in  the  CSR  standard,  and  its 
behaviour, the stakeholders can check if the firm actually respects its duties. The CSR 
standard  is  essential  in  order  to  allow  stakeholders  to  form  their  beliefs  in  the 
conformity of the firm to the ethical principles of cooperation and to decide if they may 
trust the firm. 
After  dispositions  have  fostered  the  diffusion  of  CSR  principles  and  the  CSR 
standard has activated the beliefs, we will observe that stakeholders (both weak and 
strong stakeholders) start a cooperative relationship with the firm and start to undertake 
investment at an optimal level in the firm.  
According  to  our  idea  of  conformist  preferences,  stakeholders  characterized  by 
cognitive  SC  do  not  get  only  an economic  payoff  by  cooperating  with  a firm  who 
conforms  with  ethical  principles  of  cooperation.  They  also  get  an  ideal  utility  that 
originates from the fact of cooperating with a firm who respects the principles with 
which they want to conform.  
If the firm behaves opportunistically with one or more stakeholders the ideal utility 
goes  to  zero  for  all  the  stakeholders,  because  they  observe  that  the  firm  stops 
conforming to the ethical principles of cooperation. If the loss of the ideal utility is high 
enough, the stakeholders may decide to interrupt their cooperation with the firm (and 
maybe  to  start  a  new  relation  with  another  firm  who  respects  the  principles).  This 
possibility does not worry the firm when it concerns only the weak stakeholders. On the 
contrary, the interruption of the cooperation may generate a economic loss for the firm 
if it is decided by strong stakeholders. 
On the basis of these premises, the reasoning developed in section 4.3 has shown 
that  the  cognitive  SC  of  strong  stakeholders,  associated  with  the  adoption  of  CSR 
practices  by  the  firm,  may  avoid  opportunistic  behaviour  of  the  firm  against  weak 
stakeholders, even though, in each single relationship with weak stakeholders, the firm 
would  have  economic  incentive  to  defect.  Essentially,  the  possibility  that  strong 
stakeholders decide not to cooperate with the firm if it defects with weak stakeholders is 
a reliable threat for the firm that may decide (it depends on the payoff structure) to 
cooperate with weak stakeholders in order to avoid sanctions from strong stakeholders. 
In conclusion, our analysis identifies the conditions for a virtuous circle between 
cognitive  SC,  CSR  and  structural  SC.  In  particular,  dispositions,  beliefs  and  CSR 
practices  make  sustainable  cooperative  relations  between  the  firm  and  its  weak 
stakeholders that would not be sustainable otherwise. This is a socially desirable result 
because: 1) all the stakeholders undertake investment at an optimal level in the firm; 2) 
the cooperation between the firm and all its stakeholders is successful and generates an 





In this appendix we focus on the function F which is a function, shared by all the 
agents, of the social normative criterion T.   19 
Following Grimalda and Sacconi (2002), we adopt a particular specification for F 
based on an idea of expected mutuality in conforming to the normative prescriptions. 
Grimalda and Sacconi (2002) restrict the attention to a two-person game and define two 
indices that contribute to determine F: 
1.  fi : the index of conditional conformity of player i (or degree of deviation from 
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i i b T σ is the actual level of T when player i 
implements strategy σi given what he expects from player j. 
fi varies from 0 (no deviation at all from the principle T) to -1 (maximal deviation). 
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i b  is the first order belief that player 1 has in the action of player j. 
2
i b  is the second 
order belief about player j’s belief in the action adopted by player i.  ) (
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MIN b T are the value that the welfare function takes when player j respectively 
maximises or minimises it, given the second order belief of player i. In other words, 
those functions indicate the maximum and minimum value that player j can attribute 





i b ) is the actual value that i expects the welfare function to take 
according to his beliefs. 
−
f j varies between 0 and -1 that respectively indicates the 
maximum  and  minimum  degree  of  conformity  by  player  j  to  the  ideology  as 
embodied in the welfare function T. 
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.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿
"￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ !￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
0*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ (￿￿￿ ￿ -￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ +2 ￿￿￿
￿￿￿3 ￿￿-￿4 /￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿1￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
-￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ +￿￿
￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿%￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿
0￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ > ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿!￿ " ￿&" ￿￿" ￿6￿￿ ￿ $￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿’￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿%-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿  ￿ ’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿￿ -￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ #-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿   ￿& ￿￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿7￿￿
)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿’ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
)￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿* ￿ 2￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ? ,￿￿￿(￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿9 ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ > ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿: ￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ " ￿
1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.0 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ? *￿ ￿ ￿￿ / @ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.0 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿? *￿ ￿ ￿￿/ / @ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
.> ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ &￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ,￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿.￿￿ ￿￿6￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿/￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ 3￿￿ !￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ (￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿& ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿’ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ !￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ; ￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<
%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿* ￿2￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (/ ￿￿.￿ ￿1-.￿ 7 B B ￿ ’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿3 =￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿9 ￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿(￿ ￿) ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿: ￿ 3￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ &#*￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ $￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 .0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ &￿ ￿￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
.0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.> ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿
)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿   ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿
.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ & ￿ !￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $￿ ￿ ,￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ’ ￿ >￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿8￿-￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ * ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿!￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1￿ ) ￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ . ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ 9 ￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ : ￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿. $"￿
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
&￿ ￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿. ￿-￿￿/￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ C 3￿ ￿ ￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿
￿￿￿ .￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ . ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿￿6￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿+2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿-￿4 /￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿  ￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿& ￿+￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿*￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿’ ￿ !￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ $￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ &￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿%￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿%-￿D￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿* ￿2￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿.0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿"4 ￿3 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿





￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿: ￿ !￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 5 " ￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
&￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
*￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ )  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿F￿￿￿’￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿
7￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿  ￿,￿￿ ￿￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿6￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿￿￿￿￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿@￿￿-￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿’ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿(!￿? ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿@ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿* ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿9 ￿ / ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ,￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿#￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿: ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿6￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿￿ > ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ / ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿￿’￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿3￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿   ￿6￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ & ￿2￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ’ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿6￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿￿ ￿ ￿&￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿*￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ * ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ 9 ￿#￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
%￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ : ￿ .￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 1￿ ￿￿ ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿!￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ )  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿￿ ￿ -￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
-￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ -￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
.%￿-￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿￿￿1￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ %￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ !￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ 7￿￿ )￿￿￿￿
)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿  ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,￿￿￿.0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿& ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ !￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ *￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿#-￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿’ ￿￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿* ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿&￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿.0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿/￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿9 ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿-￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿(￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ )  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿: ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿-￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ " ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0  ￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿
)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ * ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ .￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ "-￿￿￿￿￿
+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿.!￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿
￿￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿4￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿6￿￿) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿5  3￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿6 %￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ , 7￿￿)￿￿￿￿
)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿7 1￿ ￿ ￿!￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿, 
7￿￿)￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿9   ,￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿: ￿#￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿A￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿
. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿ ￿ ￿G￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿6￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿’￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ *￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿￿ -￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ -￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿ ￿￿!￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ $￿ ￿%￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿,￿￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿3￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ 9 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿













































































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿